Working Papers:
Do Firms Manipulate their Carbon Emissions Reporting? (with Brandon Gipper and Shawn Shi) [SSRN Link]
[Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Accounting Research]
We document that firms underreport carbon emissions in the aftermath of firm-specific, high-profile climate controversies. To tie underreporting to manipulation, we show that firms underreport more when they avoid costly decarbonization, enjoy greater reporting discretion, and experience greater stakeholder backlash. Additional analysis suggests that firms manipulate primarily to avoid reputational damage. Following controversies, firms increase their use of third-party assurance, consistent with attempts to bolster the credibility of reported emissions. Yet such assurance does not reduce subsequent underreporting unless board oversight exists. In another setting, we additionally find evidence that firms selectively apply carbon accounting rules to restate historical emissions in ways that create favorable trends. Together, we provide large sample evidence consistent with firms intentionally misreporting their carbon emissions.
- Presented: Financial Accounting Research Symposium 2026, University of Washington
- Co-author presentations: Utah Winter Accounting Conference 2026, Carbon Accounting Standards Initiative, Singapore Accounting Symposium 2026, University of Miami
Show Your Work: Paystub Requirements and Wage Theft (with Beth Blankespoor)
Wage theft costs workers in the U.S. billions of dollars annually. Paystubs include information critical for identifying and investigating wage theft, yet many states do not require firms to provide them. We ask whether requiring firms to disclose paystubs to employees deters wage theft. Using state-level variation in paystub disclosure requirements and geographic variation of firms’ establishments across states, we find that when establishments are required to provide paystubs, they are less likely to underpay their workers for overtime hours. This relation exists whether the requirement comes directly from the establishment’s state or indirectly via the firm’s headquarter state. Further, the relation is stronger when enforcement is more robust, labor market competition is lower, and wage information is more complex. Our findings suggest a gap in federal labor regulations and help identify workers who are vulnerable to wage theft.
- Presented: Financial Accounting Research Symposium 2026, BYU Accounting Research Symposium 2025, University of Washington
- Co-author presentations: University of Oregon, Northeastern University, University of Tennessee, University of Pittsburgh
- Based on 2nd-year summer paper
Works in Progress:
Out of Order: Investor Processing of Supply Chain Disasters
- Job market paper in data collection stage.